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Abstract
Spontaneous Trait Inference (STI) is a psychological phenomenon that allows people to
infer personality traits from others’ behaviors without any intention or awareness. This
phenomenon helps us organize our complex social world and ultimately it shapes our
interaction with others. The goal of this manuscript is 1) to conduct a systematic
analysis of the different types of measures that are currently used to detect inferences,
2) to identify their main limitations and 3) to propose a new paradigm that overcomes
most of these limitations. The new paradigm is based on the modified free association
task that Hourihan and MacLeod (2007) proposed as a pure conceptual implicit
memory measure. This new paradigm simultaneously overcomes the contamination
problem of memory measures and the dependency on data-driven processing of the
activation measures. In the presented experiments we use the modified free association
paradigm to detect STIs and also to compare its results to the naming task and the
modified Stroop task. We show that this measure is able to reliably detect STI and
discuss why it is more appropriate to study inferences. Additionally, we show that it
can be used to investigate the underlying processes responsible for STI and to
distinguish it from similar but different phenomena like Spontaneous Trait
Transference. This manuscript focuses on STIs, but the arguments presented here apply
to any research field that investigates spontaneous inference making.
Keywords: inference making, activation measures, memory measures, modified free
association paradigm, conceptually-driven task.
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Capturing spontaneous trait inference with the modified free association paradigm
Introduction
Spontaneous trait inference (STI) is a social inference that occurs when, for
example, the man who holds the door for someone is unintentionally categorized as
“friendly” or the woman who jumps the line as “rude”. The inference of such traits
constitutes the basis of the impressions we create about others. In turn, impressions
shape the way we interact with others – perhaps avoiding the rude woman or seeking
out the friendly man. Winter and Uleman (1984) provided the first empirical evidence
for STI by showing that participants unintentionally inferred personality traits after
reading behavioral descriptions. Since then, studies have shown that trait inference is a
spontaneous process that occurs outside our awareness (Lupfer, Clark, & Hutcherson,
1990) and during the encoding of behavioral descriptions (e.g., Carlston & Skowronski,
1994; Winter & Uleman, 1984; Uleman, Newman, & Moskowitz, 1996). It was shown
that STI is maintained across more demanding experimental settings including short
stimulus presentation timings and cognitive load (e.g., Carlston & Skowronski, 1994;
Todorov & Uleman, 2003) and that it lingers after explicit recall has faded (Carlston,
Skowronski, & Sparks, 1995).
STI is typically investigated with the following paradigms: cued-recall (e.g.,
Winter & Uleman, 1984; Winter, Uleman, & Cunniff, 1985; Todorov & Uleman, 2002;
Van Duynslaeger, Van Overwalle, & Verstraeten, 2007), probe recognition (e.g., Uleman,
Hon, Roman, & Moskowitz, 1996; Newman, 1991; Ham & Vonk, 2003; Wigboldus,
Sherman, Franzese, & van Knippenberg, 2004), savings in relearning (e.g., Carlston &
Skowronski, 1994; Carlston et al., 1995; Carlston & Skowronski, 2005; Crawford,
Skowronski, Stiff, & Leonards, 2008; McCarthy & Skowronski, 2011; Schneid, Crawford,
Skowronski, Irwin, & Carlston, 2015), and false recognition (e.g., Todorov & Uleman,
2002, 2003, 2004; Goren & Todorov, 2009; Rim, Min, Uleman, Chartrand, & Carlston,
2013; Lee, Shimizu, & Uleman, 2015). Despite the extensive research and the valuable
knowledge brought by these paradigms to the field, they present several shortcomings.
Over time, the paradigms were refined in agreement with the emerging concerns in
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the field and, as a consequence, some of their limitations were solved while others
remain unattended. The first goal of the paper is to present the reader with a
compendium of requirements that a good paradigm should satisfy in order to rigorously
measure STI. The second objective is to inspect how and which requirements are
fulfilled in each of the currently used paradigms. And finally, we will introduce a new
paradigm, the modified free association paradigm (MFAP), as a possible solution to
overcome most of the limitations discussed throughout the paper.
A paradigm, in order to rigorously detect an inference, should fulfill the following
requirements:
Demand: A paradigm that measures a spontaneous process implicitly should
direct participants’ attention to the behavioral information without encouraging explicit
trait impression goals (Uleman, 1999). To accomplish this, participants are usually
instructed to familiarize themselves with the material (e.g., Skowronski, Carlston, Mae,
& Crawford, 1998; Crawford, Skowronski, Stiff, & Scherer, 2007; Crawford et al., 2008)
or to memorize it (e.g., Winter & Uleman, 1984; Newman, 1993; Todorov & Uleman,
2002; Goren & Todorov, 2009). However, even if the instruction is to memorize the
material, participants might still infer traits in a strategic way in order to improve their
performance in the memory task, and even more so when they are aware that the
inference can actually lead to the correct response. This is especially true when all the
materials used are trait-implying descriptions making it easier for the participants to
guess the researcher’s goal of studying personality impressions. Ideally, the
trait-implying material should be inserted into a larger set of neutral sentences. In sum,
this requirement concerns the type of instruction given to participants and the type of
material used to disguise the scientific purpose of the experiment.
Contamination: The paradigm should discourage strategies likely to induce
inference at the moment of retrieval and uniquely measure inference at encoding
(Keenan, Potts, Golding, & Jennings, 1990; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986; Wyer & Srull,
1986). In other words, the occurrence of an inference should be exclusively based on
measuring unconscious recollection of earlier experience, as opposed to explicit
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recollection (Schacter, 1987) that might trigger inference at the moment of recollection.
This is also known as the contamination problem of implicit measures by explicit recall
(Jacoby, 1991). Implicit measures are said to be contaminated when the participants
adopt an intentional retrieval strategy or if they are aware that the tested material is
related to the studied material. To avoid contamination, researchers should refrain from
using memory-based paradigms (i.e., paradigms that require participants to explicitly
recall past events).
Backward association: The paradigm and the material should be created in such a
way that they do not allow for backward associations to take place (Wyer & Srull,
1986). Singer (1978, as cited in Keenan et al., 1990) illustrated the effect of backward
association in a cued-recall experiment. In this experiment participants were first
presented with sentences containing actions (e.g., “stir the soup”) and later presented
with two different cues to recall the sentence (e.g., “spoon” or “ladle”). He showed that
these cues were asymmetrically related to the action. In other words, the forward
association between the action (e.g., “stir the soup”) and the first cue (e.g., “spoon”) is
strong (leading to the inference of the instrument “spoon”) whereas the backward
association is weak (meaning that the action is less likely to be generated when this cue
is provided). The opposite pattern, stronger backward than forward association, was
found for the second cue (e.g., “ladle”). Thus, if “ladle” is used as cue, the activation
that spreads from the cue (“ladle”) to the action (“stir the soup”), i.e., backwards, will
mimic an inference made at encoding. Note that this confounding factor is closely
related with the contamination problem because the backward association is more likely
to occur if the participants are required to retrieve the implying sentence. Although,
backward association is not trivial to overcome, it can be addressed through the use of
stimuli that have associative asymmetries, like the material used by Singer (1978), in
order to test the paradigm sensitivity to backward associations.
Word-based priming: It should be guaranteed that the activation of the trait is a
consequence of text-based priming and not word-based priming. In other words, the
inference should result from processing the meaning of the behavior and not from
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processing specific words in the sentence that are individually associated with the trait
(Keenan et al., 1990; Orghian, Ramos, & Garcia-Marques, n.d.). One possible way of
avoiding this confound is by having control sentences that contain roughly the same
words as the trait-implying ones but rearranged in such a way that they no longer
imply the trait. This method equates the two types of sentences in terms of word-based
priming.
Conceptual: It should be a task that is sensitive to top-down phenomena, meaning
it should be able to detect concepts activated via meaning-based processing. Roediger
and Blaxton (1987) named these kind of measures conceptually-driven tasks, as opposed
to data-driven. The distinction between data-driven and conceptually-driven tasks
concerns the distinction between tasks in which participants rely more on physical
features of the stimulus, and those where the focus on the physical features is minimal
and where conceptually-based and top-down processes are used (Roediger & Blaxton,
1987). This perspective assumes that any task can rely on both types of processes,
meaning any task can be situated on the continuum between data-driven processes on
one pole and conceptually-driven processes on the other. This view emphasizes the
processes operating in each task by claiming that there are “benefits to the extent that
the operations required at the test recapitulate or overlap the encoding operations
during prior learning” (Roediger, Weldon, & Challis, 1989, p. 16). Applying this logic
to trait inferences, it is clear that the process taking place at encoding is
conceptually-driven since the meaning of a whole sentence has to be comprehended in
order for the trait to be inferred. Moreover, no perceptual features can be processed
because the trait is only implied and not actually presented at encoding. Thus, a
conceptual task that only minimally depends of the perceptual features of the target
will be more sensitive to such high-level process.
In the context of STI, we use the term data-driven, not only to refer to tasks that
depend on perceptual features of the target, but also to tasks in which the performance
depends on the activation of specific labels. Thus, if a researcher expects the
participant to activate a certain label/trait and presents that trait for a recognition
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test, the detection of the inference is restricted to the activation of that specific trait. If
we assume that an inference is the activation of a semantic area that can be represented
by multiple traits (e.g., synonyms), we should then equate the possibility of mislabeling,
that is, that the trait activated via the inference made by the participant may not be
the same as the trait used by the researcher at test. The label given at test has an
important role because it will guide the retrieval process in a data driven or bottom-up
manner. The ultimate solution for this problem is the free recall task, because no label
is provided and recall happens in a top-down manner that is idiosyncratic to each
participant. However, since the target word is only implied by the material given at
study, there is no easy way to elicit the recall of something that was not directly
presented and that the participant is not even aware of.
Delayed: It should be possible to apply the measure in delayed mode (as opposed
to immediate mode), meaning the inference should be measurable even after a period of
delay from the moment the sentence is read. This will allow detection of inferences that
occur later on in the integration process (Till, Mross, & Kintsch, 1988; Calvo &
Castillo, 1998; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1989a). This is important because we don’t only
want to know if the trait is activated at that specific moment in time, we need to
understand if the inferred trait is integrated in the final representation of the encoded
event and if it is stable over time.
In the following section we will analyze in more details the existing paradigms (see
Table 1 for a summary) in the STI field. Afterwards, we will present a new paradigm
and discuss its advantages compared to the paradigms already used in the field.
Paradigms and their limitations
Inferences are traditionally measured with memory or activation tasks (for a
review see Keenan et al., 1990). In memory measures, participants are asked to retrieve
a past event or to state whether or not a target word featured in some earlier text.
Activation measures, on the contrary, do not rely on retrieval of previously presented
material but on measuring the activation of the inferred concept with implicit tasks
such the lexical decision task.
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Memory-based measures
The cued-recall paradigm was the first measure used in STI literature and for that
reason it has been one of the most recurrently used (Winter & Uleman, 1984; Winter et
al., 1985; Claeys, 1990; Uleman, Moskowitz, Roman, & Rhee, 1993; Uleman, Winborne,
Winter, & Shechter, 1986; Uleman & Moskowitz, 1994; Bassili & Smith, 1986). Winter
and Uleman (1984) were the first to show that dispositional cues implied by (but not
presented with) trait-implying sentences were more effective recall cues for those
sentences than semantic associates of words presented in those sentences. For example,
the recall of the sentence “The librarian carries the old woman’s groceries across the
street.” was better cued by the trait word “helpful” than by the semantic cue “books” or
by no cue at all. Cued-recall is a delayed measure because the measurement (the
cued-recall phase) is only conducted after all the sentences are memorized, as opposed
to trial by trial. The greater efficacy of the trait cue is interpreted as evidence that
participants had spontaneously inferred the trait upon reading the sentence.
Yet, some researchers questioned the interpretation that traits are inferred during
the reading of the sentence in the cued-recall paradigm. They argue that the trait word
given at test can prompt the recall of the behavior, through backward association from
the trait to the behavior. Presenting the trait during the memory test can trigger the
generation of typical behavioral exemplars that, in turn, can cue the recall of the
correct behavior (e.g., Corbett & Dosher, 1978; Srull & Wyer, 1989). This happens
because the participants are explicitly asked to retrieve the sentences. Moreover, while
trying to retrieve the sentences the participants can generate the inferences (or realize
that the cues and the sentences are compatible) at that moment in time, a result of the
contamination problem mentioned before. Another limitation of this paradigm is the
lack of control for the word-based priming (Keenan et al., 1990), that is, the trait can
become activated via the presence of very specific words that are part of the sentence
without any consideration for the meaning of the sentence as a whole. Moreover, the
sentences are usually all trait-implying, meaning the participants can easily understand
the relevance of trait inference in the context of the task. Finally, some have argued
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that the results in this paradigm might reflect part-list cueing effects since they rely on
a within-participant contrast between cued and non-cued recall (D’Agostino & Beegle,
1996). This is solved by contrasting the recall with different types of cues and ignoring
the non-cue condition.
The recognition probe paradigm is another memory measure (Ham & Vonk, 2003;
Newman, 1991; Uleman, Hon, et al., 1996; Van Overwalle, Drenth, & Marsman, 1999;
Wigboldus, Dijksterhuis, & Van Knippenberg, 2003; Wigboldus et al., 2004) whose use
was imported to social cognition (Uleman, Hon, et al., 1996) from discourse
comprehension literature (e.g., McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986). In this paradigm,
participants are presented with trait-implying sentences under memory instructions and
immediately after reading each sentence a probe word is presented. In the critical trials,
the probe word is the trait implied in the sentence and the instruction is to indicate
whether or not the word was part of the sentence. The logic of the task is that if the
trait is inferred from the sentence it will be more activated and thus, it will be more
difficult (demonstrated by longer reaction times) for the participant to state that the
probe did not occur in the sentence and/or the responses will be less accurate. Contrary
to cued-recall, that is a delayed measure, probe recognition is usually applied in an
immediate fashion. However, it has been occasionally applied in a delayed mode (see for
example Van Overwalle et al., 1999; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986).
The recognition probe paradigm, when used with the appropriate control
sentences solves the limitation of word-based priming. Uleman and colleagues (1996)
used control sentences that were rearrangements of the words in the trait-implying
sentences but no longer implied the traits. This ensures that the two sentences (control
and trait-implying) are equal in terms of activation coming from specific words, since
the words used in each are closely matched. If any difference is found between the two
versions (say longer reaction times to reject the trait in the trait-implying condition), it
must result from processing the meaning of the sentence, or, in other words, from
inference making present in the trait-implying sentence and absent in the rearranged
version. However, the use of these types of controls is not the norm but an exception.
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Also, contrary to cued-recall, in this task the problem of participants inferring the trait
as a strategy to improve memory is solved because inference making leads to worse,
rather than better, performance. The main limitation of this paradigm is that we don’t
know whether the inference is drawn during encoding or during test, due to the
contamination problem. The task requires the participant to check the probe against
the sentence. While checking the probe against the sentence, the participant can be led
to make the inference on the spot. The inference being drawn at the test moment can
lead to slower responses, exactly as would be expected if the trait had been inferred at
encoding. Sometimes, a deadline procedure is applied in order to deal with
contamination (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986). It is assumed that contamination is less
likely to occur and the responses are more automatic if participants are compelled to
answer within a brief window time.
Carlston and collaborators (Carlston & Skowronski, 1994; Carlston et al., 1995;
Carlston & Skowronski, 2005) developed a different memory-based paradigm called
saving in relearning. In this paradigm, participants are instructed to familiarize
themselves with trait-implying paragraphs describing behaviors paired with photos
representing the actor of those behaviors. After a distraction task, they have to
memorize photos of people paired with personality traits. Some of the traits were
implied in the paragraphs presented with those actors in the first phase, whereas others
are new. The argument is as follows: if traits are inferred about the actors during the
encoding of the paragraphs, then pairing the same photo with the implied trait would
reinstate the initial inference which will lead to faster learning of these pairs than
learning new pairs (a result called saving in relearning). In the test phase the photo is
presented again, this time as a cue to recall the trait. Recall is expected to be better in
the relearning trials than in the newly paired trials. This paradigm investigates, in an
elegant way, not only the inference of the trait from the paragraph but also the link
between the actor and the trait (for more see Carlston et al., 1995).
In saving in relearning paradigm, it is also difficult to conclude that the trait is
inferred during the reading of the behavior. In the relearning phase, when the actor and
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the trait are presented for memorization, the participant might strategically retrieve the
behavior in order to improve their memorization of the trait and thus draw the
inference during this retrieval. Note however, that the authors of this paradigm argued
against contamination by showing that the effects remained even when trials were
dropped if the participants recalled the corresponding behaviors, as well as following a
delay of up to 7 days between the study and the test (Carlston & Skowronski, 1994).
This paradigm is always applied without effective control for word-based priming.
Additionally, the use of paragraphs, as opposed to singles sentences, is not optimal
because it was shown that pairing multiple trait-implying sentences with faces is enough
to trigger explicit impression formation goals (Park, 1989), undermining in this way the
spontaneity assumption.
Finally, false recognition is a memory-based paradigm developed by Todorov and
Uleman (2002, 2003, 2004). In this paradigm, participants are first exposed to pairs of
photos of people alongside sentences describing their behavior, under memorization
instruction. After being exposed to this material, they are presented again with the
same photos paired, this time, with traits. The task here is to indicate whether the trait
word occurred within the sentence paired with the photo in the first phase of the study
(as some of the sentences contained the actual traits within the descriptive text).
Higher false recognition rate is expected if the trait was inferred from the sentence in
the initial phase. This happens because, once the trait is inferred, it is part of the
representation of the event and, as such, it is difficult for the participant to distinguish
what was actually presented from what was inferred.
In the false recognition paradigm, the participant is also required to contrast the
trait against the sentence memorized in the first phase, which means reconstructive
processes can occur. When the participant tries to remember the behavior, the
inference can be drawn. Moreover, no control sentences are used in this paradigm, only
trait-implying sentences and trait-implying sentences that actually contain the traits,
making it very prone to the “demand” limitation. The false recognition paradigm also
fails to control for word-based priming because rearranged sentences are not used. Also,
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this paradigm has an interesting characteristic; because trait inference leads to false
recognition, that is, to a poorer performance, the incentive for inference making as part
of a reconstructive process is low. Both, the saving in relearning and the false
recognition are delayed measures of inferences.
Activation measures
Lexical decision is an activation measure that gives the researcher access to the
activated trait without explicitly asking the participant to retrieve the behavioral
description. Zárate, Uleman, and Voils (2001), in order to avoid the reconstructive
process criticism associated with memory measures, used lexical decision to access the
inference during encoding. In this paradigm, participants are presented with strings of
letters and their task is to indicate as quickly and accurately as possible whether or not
the letter string is a real word. Zárate and colleagues presented two types of trials to
their participants. One where the target given for lexical decision was a trait, and it was
preceded by a behavioral description that implied that trait, and one where the trait
was preceded by a control sentence that was unrelated to the trait. A facilitation was
detected for implied traits compared to the traits unrelated to the preceding sentences.
One limitation of the lexical decision paradigm is that the type of control does not
control for word-based priming. There is also some evidence that the relationship
between the sentence and the trait affects the lexical decision latencies, suggesting that
the two are contrasted one against each other (Balota & Chumbley, 1984; West &
Stanovich, 1982; Neely, Keefe, & Ross, 1989). More precisely, these studies showed that
the backward association between the target and a prime affects lexical decision
latencies. And, as mentioned before, a good task should be sensitive to the prime-target
associations (forward inference) but should not be sensitive to target-prime associations
(backward associations). This is even more important when the measure is applied in
an immediate mode (as in Zárate et al., 2001) because any relationship between the
target and the prime is easier to access. However, this measure can easily be applied in
a delayed mode (as done for example by Potts, Keenan, & Golding, 1988, in the text
comprehension literature).
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The word stem completion task is another activation measure used to study STI.
Whitney and Williams - Whitney (1990) used constrained word stems to detect online
(i.e., drawn at encoding) inferences. Participants in this paradigm start by reading
trait-implying or control paragraphs and then complete word stems (e.g., F R _ _ _ _
_ _ for FRIENDLY) with the first word coming to their mind that would fit into the
blanks. If the trait is activated by the trait-implying sentence then the trait will be
used to complete the stem more often than it would be in the control condition (e.g.,
Whitney & Williams-Whitney, 1990; Bassili, Smith, & MacLeod, 1989).
This word stem completion task is usually applied with effective control for
word-based priming, i.e., with rearranged versions of the trait-implying paragraphs
(Whitney & Williams-Whitney, 1990). Moreover, this measure was shown to be
unaffected by backward associations (probably because the target word is not presented
in its complete format) and thus, seems to be immune to retrieval processes (for more
see Whitney, Waring, & Zingmark, 1992). For these reasons this task can be considered
a better measure than the lexical decision task. However, there is one important
limitation we would like to point out to this paradigm that also applies to all the
previous paradigms. The answer the participant is expected to provide is used as a
measure of the activation of a specific trait that the sentence, previously tested, is
supposed to imply. However, this is based on a questionable assumption that all the
participants infer the expected pre-tested trait. For example, in Whitney and
colleagues’ pilot study (1992) participants were asked to generate traits for behavioral
descriptions. The traits used as targets in the stem completion task were generated by
the participants in the pilot study on average 54% of the time (with the least
consensual being generated 35% and the most consensual 90%). This clearly shows that
not all the participants infer the same traits, and this applies to all the paradigms
previously discussed. However, the same target traits (or stems) are presented for all
the participants at test. When a specific trait is used in the test phase, the effect will
only be observed if that specific word has been lexically activated. If at encoding, rather
than the pre-tested trait a synonym was activated, the expected lexical facilitation will
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not be observed. If this happens, it will appear that no inference occurred, when in fact
the representation of the target concept was activated. In a more extreme case, the
activated representation might not even overlap with the meaning of the target
expected to be given in the stem completion task.
In other words, activation measures like the lexical decision and the word stem
completion and memory measures like the false recognition and the probe recognition
are data-driven tasks, as opposed to conceptually-driven tasks, in the sense that they
are dependent on the activation of specific lexical formats. In the STI literature the
paradigms are never analyzed from this perspective (data-drive versus
conceptually-driven) but that is not true in implicit memory literature. For example,
the word stem completion and the lexical decision tasks were characterized as being far
closer to the data-driven pole of the continuum than to the conceptual pole (e.g.,
Hamann & Squire, 1996; Roediger, Weldon, Stadler, & Riegler, 1992). Some memory
measures like the free recall can be considered conceptual tests, because the participant
directly accesses their representation in memory, rather than being given a trait that
then drives the retrieval. However, none of the memory measures presented before are
conceptual because the to-be-inferred trait is provided to the participant at some
moment during the experiment.
The paradigm that seems less affected by this dependency on specific lexical
formats is the saving in relearning. In this paradigm, in the test phase only the photo of
the actor is presented as cue and the participant is instructed to recall the trait that
was presented with that actor in the relearning phase. The effect is still very dependent
of that specific trait, but the previous presentation of the trait in the relearning phase
pre-activates that trait, meaning that any competition between this form and similar
ones was solved before the critical measure is applied. However, as with all the memory
measures presented before, saving in relearning might be contaminated by explicit
retrieval. Activation measures solve, in part, the contamination problem, but they rely
heavily on data-driven processes, which, as argued before, is not a good fit for a
top-down mechanism like STI.
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A conceptually-driven measure that is not based on memory would solve both the
contamination problem and the sensitivity to conceptual processing requirement. In the
following section we present a new paradigm to measure STI that solves both problems.
Modified Free Association Paradigm– MFAP
Hourihan and MacLeod’s (2007) modified word association paradigm is a
conceptually-driven measure of implicit memory that seems to overcome most of the
limitations of the paradigms presented above. In their study, in the learning phase,
participants either generated words from meaningful cues (e.g., “the piece of furniture
used for sitting –c?”) or merely read the words (e.g., “chair”). In a test phase,
participants performed a word association task where they had to speak aloud the first
word to come to mind upon sight of a prompt word that was either generated or read in
the learning phase. Generating a word at encoding primes that word in implicit
memory and this priming, or activation, extends to neighboring words in the semantic
network. Thus, when the prompt is a word that was generated by the participant in the
past, as opposed to a word that was just read, the generated word is faster to access
and so are other words within its semantic network (Nelson & Goodmon, 2002).
Translated to trait inference research, the premise is that reading a trait-implying
sentence primes the implied trait word and its semantic neighbors. Thus, when the
inferred trait is encountered in the free association task, this delivers faster production
of an associate compared to un-primed traits.
Hourihan and MacLeod presented the paradigm as a conceptual implicit memory
test that provides an isolated measure of conceptual priming free from the influence of
explicit retrieval. They claim that if there is nothing to retrieve from the study episode,
explicit retrieval is not a problem. They also argue that if a concept was semantically
processed (as we think the traits are when inferred), its semantic characteristics should
be activated above a baseline, and some activation should spread to semantically
associated neighbors (e.g., activation of the trait “friendly” might lead to the activation
of the trait “nice”). The activation of the semantic network of a trait is detected via the
latencies to generate an associate. Thus, the more the semantic network of the trait was
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activated during the encoding of the behavior, the faster and easier it will be for the
participant to generate an associate.
The word association task draws upon two mechanisms: the lexical access, which
reflect access to an associate in the semantic network of the trait and the articulation of
the associate. The dependent variable in this paradigm is not the response itself but the
speed of response. Moreover, research has demonstrated that reaction time is a valuable
measure of conceptual implicit memory (e.g., Light, Prull, & Kennison, 2000). This is
the first paradigm that allows us to measure the speed to access the semantic network
of an inference. The idea of spreading activation through the network is, furthermore,
in agreement with the halo effect usually found in the STI literature. It was shown that
people do not only infer a unique trait from the behavior, but that they generalize to
other close traits and use them to make judgements about the actors performing the
behaviors (Carlston & Skowronski, 2005; Crawford, Skowronski, & Stiff, 2007;
Crawford, Skowronski, Stiff, & Scherer, 2007; Skowronski et al., 1998).
Similar to the lexical decision task, in the test phase, the to-be-inferred trait is
provided to the participant, but whereas in the lexical decision task response accuracy
is key measure, here accuracy is irrelevant because there is no correct answer. The lack
of a correct answer means that concerns about memorization processes, and
consequently contamination by explicit retrieval, can be discounted. Even though the
instruction, in the study phase, is to memorize (for more see the Procedure section in
experiment 1) the material in order to avoid activating impression formation goals, this
is an activation measure as opposed to memory measure because at test the participant
is not required to contrast the trait with the sentence. This makes this task less prone
to explicit retrieval strategies.
We cannot, nevertheless, totally exclude the possibility that backward associations
from the trait to the sentence do not affect the access to the semantic network.
However, as we show later, the inference is also detected in a delayed free association
test (experiments 2 and 3). In a delayed test, the backward association is less likely to
occur because the participant no longer has immediate access to the sentence.
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Next, we describe two more paradigms: the naming task and the modified Stroop
task. Even though these tasks are not traditionally used in the STI literature, we
decided to approach them because they are seen by some researchers as good measures
of inference (for a review see Keenan et al., 1990). We compare these two measures with
the MFAP in our second experiment.
Naming
In the naming task, after reading inference or control sentences, participants are
presented with words and instructed to read the words out loud as quickly as possible.
The naming task can be decomposed into two processing steps, lexical access and
articulation. And because these steps take place so quickly, it is difficult to imagine how
the relatedness between the target and the text, i.e., the backward association, can have
an influence. But, for the same reason, it is difficult to imagine that it can be sensitive
to higher level inferences such as text-based inferences (Norris, 1986). Thus, whereas
there are some studies showing that, unlike the lexical decision task, naming is not
affected by backward association (Seidenberg, Waters, Sanders, & Langer, 1984), there
are authors who question its ability to detect more elaborated inferences (Keenan et al.,
1990). Potts and colleagues (1988) detected inferences within the naming task.
However, they admit that this measure is less sensitive than others, which is in
agreement with the small effects they reported (between 11 and 17 ms facilitation). A
second limitation of the naming task is the possibility that it can be completed without
any access to the lexicon, via grapheme to phoneme translation rules (Keenan et al.,
1990) which is clearly a data-driven mechanism. Also, note that just like in the stem
completion and the lexical decision tasks, this effect depends on the activation of a very
specific lexical format (the word presented at test), and so, the inference of other similar
traits (e.g., synonyms) might be difficult to capture with this measure.
Modified Stroop task
The modified Stroop task is an activation measure also popular in the text
comprehension research. In this task participants usually read a text and then name the
ink color in which the test words are written (Conrad, 1974; Dosher & Corbett, 1982;
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Whitney & Kellas, 1984; Whitney, 1986). The rationale of the task is as follows: if the
trait is inferred from the inferential sentence and presented for ink color naming, the
participant will take longer to name the color of the inferred word than he would take
to name the ink color of an unprimed word. This happens because, if the word was
previously activated, it is more difficult to suppress its articulation in order to say the
ink color.
The task reflects three sub-steps: lexical access, color identification, and color
articulation. It is implausible that the relatedness between the target and the text is
affecting color identification and articulation, meaning this measure may be a purer
measure of lexical access. Keenan and colleagues argued that it might be a better
measure than the naming task, because the latencies in the modified Stroop task are
longer, avoiding possible floor effects (Keenan et al., 1990). These same researchers
claimed that this measure can distinguish between whether people process the inference
at conceptual or lexical level. If the word is primed at a conceptual level, it is more
difficult to name the color ink. An example of conceptual priming is the target “doctor”
preceded by a text about “hospitals”, as opposed to a text about “subways”. However,
when the word is primed at lexical level, via explicitly presenting the target word
“doctor”, then facilitation is expected for ink naming (Dosher & Corbett, 1982;
Whitney, 1986). The modified Stroop, like all the previous measures, is a data-driven
task. In other words, the answers in this task are dependent on the activation of very
specific traits.
When the word given at the test is different from the one inferred, the articulation
of the word at test is not supposed to interfere with color ink naming because that
specific lexical format was not activated before. In MFAP, if the trait provided at test is
the one inferred by the participant, then facilitation (in terms of the latencies to
generate associates) is expected at both lexical level (e.g., “helpful” inferred and “help”
generated as an associate) and conceptual level because the trait is part of a larger
activated network (“helpful” inferred and “concerned” or “aid” generated). If the trait
inferred is different from the one provided at the test, any facilitation that is eventually
MODIFIED FREE ASSOCIATION PARADIGM AND STI 19
observed cannot be a consequence of that specific lexical format, it has to be due to
conceptual priming. In other words, the facilitation happens due to the fact that the
activated concept is part of a larger activated network of interconnected concepts.
If sensitive to trait inference, MFAP will be a fruitful contribution to trait
inference research as it overcomes some of the limitations of the existing paradigms.
First, to avoid explicit impression formation goals, the material, in this task, is
presented under memorization instruction for a later unspecified test and it is embedded
in a set of neutral sentences. Second, the memorization phase and the free association
phase are presented as separate tasks, making is more difficult for the participant to be
aware of the relation between the two. Moreover, because there is no need to explicitly
retrieve past information, contamination with explicit processes is less likely to occur.
Third, it is possible to control for word-based priming by including rearranged versions
of the trait-implying material. Fourth, it is a conceptually-driven task, meaning the
operations happening at test recapitulate, to some extent, the top-down operations
taking place at encoding. And finally, it is easy to apply MFAP in delayed fashion, so
that the participants read all the behavioral descriptions first and are tested in a
separate phase. Furthermore, in MFAP participants remain unaware of what is being
tested as the task has no explicit success criteria, and indeed the word content produced
is irrelevant.
In three experiments, we test MFAP and its sensitivity to STI. In experiment 1,
we predicted that the reaction time to generate an associate for a trait prompt will be
faster when following trait-implying than control sentences. This is due to the fact that
priming a trait word activates its semantic network and increases the accessibility of
related words in implicit memory. In experiment 2, we compare the MFAP with the
modified Stroop task and with the naming task. In experiment 3, we show that the
MFAP can be also useful to study the relevance of the actor to the presented behavior
and the link between the inferred trait and the actor. Moreover, we test
the sensitivity of MFAP to differences between STI and Spontaneous Trait
Transference (STT), a cognitive error that results in the transference of the inferred
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trait to a person who is not the actor of the behavior (Carlston & Skowronski, 2005;
Crawford, Skowronski, & Stiff, 2007).
Experiment 1- MFAP
The aim of experiment 1 was to validate the use of MFAP in detecting the
occurrence of STIs. Participants, in each trial, were presented with a sentence followed
by a prompt word for free association. Upon sight of the prompt, they were asked to
speak aloud the first word that came to their mind. In the critical trials, the sentence
was either trait-implying (e.g.“He phoned for help while the others just screamed.”) or a
rearranged control (e.g.“He screamed for the others to help find the phone.”) and the
prompt was the trait word implied in the trait-implying sentence (the trait “calm”).
Following Hourihan and MacLeod’s (2007) rationale, we predicted that the
trait-implying sentence will prime the semantic network of the trait word and lead to
faster generation of an associate when compared to unprimed traits presented in the
control condition.
Method
Participants. 39 undergraduate students from Birmingham University
participated in this study for academic credits. 6 were males and the mean age of the
sample was 19.46 (SD = 1.28) years old. In this experiment, the criteria used to decide
the minimal sample size was based on the sample size reported by Hourihan and
MacLeod (2007) in their first study (N = 30). The data, in this and in the following
experiments, was only analyzed after the reported samples were complete.
Material. 24 pairs of sentences from Uleman, Hon, Roman and Moskowitz’s
(1996) studies were used in the current experiment. For each trait-implying sentence,
there was a control sentence that had approximately the same words but rearranged in
such a way that the trait was no longer implied.
Pre-test: To validate the material for the population in the United Kingdom, we conducted a
pilot study where the material was adapted (American expressions changed to British) and given to
participants for a rating task. 72 English native speakers living in the UK took part in this pilot study.
Each of them was presented with 12 trait-implying sentences and 12 rearranged sentences. The two
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versions of the same sentence were never presented to the same participant. In each trial, the
participant was provided with a trait and a sentence. The instruction was to indicate to what extent
they believed the trait belonged to the person performing the action described in the sentence by using
a slider (going from 0 - not at all to 100 - totally). Next, we calculated, individually for each trait, the
average ratings for each trait-implying and rearranged sentences. The average difference between the
ratings for the trait-implying and the rearranged sentences was 44.51, with the smallest difference being
22.46 (for the trait “ambitious”, for which the trait-implying sentence was “She held a full-time job
while being a full-time student.” and the rearranged was “She couldn’t hold a full-time job while being
a full-time student.”) and the largest difference being 70.67 (for the trait “sociable”, with the
trait-implying sentence being “He liked parties more than films.” and the rearranged being “He liked
films more than parties.”). The difference between the rearranged (M = 37.77, SD = 20.35) and the
trait-implying sentences (M = 82.29, SD = 6.28) was significant, t(23) = 10.64, p < .001, and in the
expected direction. All 24 pairs of sentences and the correspondent traits tested in this pilot were used
in the experiment. 24 non pre-tested pairs of trait-implying and rearranged sentences were also
included as filler (see the Procedure section for details). Additionally, we had 36 neutral sentences that
were also used as fillers and were not meant to imply any specific traits (“She rented a summer place
where she went the previous year.”). For the free association task, we had 24 critical traits
(corresponding to the pairs of sentences from the pilot study; e.g., “sociable”), 12 traits unrelated to
any of the sentences (e.g., “reliable”) and 48 non-trait words (e.g., “drill”).
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a sound proof lab on a desktop PC with
17-inch CRT monitor. Instructions and stimuli were presented in size 14 pt white font
on a black screen. The software used to build the experiment was OpenSesame
(Mathôt, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2012), a multi-platform open source tool. A Sony
plug-in headphones sounded the ‘bleep’ warning for the prompt in the free association
task and a microphone recorded verbal reaction times digitally. The experimenter noted
response content by hand. In the pilot study mentioned above, Qualtrics was used to
conduct the study and Prolific platform to publicize it.
Participants were told that the experiment was an investigation about
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multitasking and about how people cope with the multiple requirements of the
environment. More precisely, they were asked to memorize sentences while doing a
concurrent task - performing associations with target words. The two tasks (sentence
memorization and free association) were presented as unrelated. Participants were
instructed to memorize the sentences in order to encourage attendance of the stimuli
and avoid overt impression formation goals. After each sentence, a word was presented
for the free association task and the instruction was to say the first word that comes to
their mind upon sight of the prompt, as quickly as possible. In the free association task
they were told that there was no wrong or right response. Before the study began, the
experimenter helped the participants to fit the headset and microphone and instructed
them to read aloud a series of words on the screen to optimize microphone recording
threshold. Participants were instructed to speak clearly and to avoid clearing their
throats or making any other noise that would invalidate their response. They started
with four practice trials that were followed by an opportunity to ask questions.
Each trial began with a 500 ms fixation cross that was followed by the presentation
of a sentence. The sentence remained on the screen for 4000 ms. Participants were
instructed to read the sentence silently and memorize it. The sentence was replaced by
a 500 ms blank screen, after which a bleep sound warned participants about the prompt
was about to appear. Between the bleep and the prompt, a 40 ms blank screen was
presented. The prompt remained on screen until a vocal response was detected. At this
point, the word disappeared and a new trial began. In total there were 84 trials. The
presentation order of the sentence-prompt pairs was randomized for each participant.
Because we did not want the two versions (trait-implying and the rearranged)
corresponding to the same trait to be presented to the same participant we created two
versions of the experiment. In version A, 12 traits were preceded by their trait-implying
sentences and the other 12 by the rearranged/control sentences. In version B, the 12
traits that in version A were preceded by trait-implying sentences were preceded here
by controls and the 12 that were preceded by controls in version A, in version B were
preceded by trait-implying sentences. The assignment of the trait to one version or
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another was done randomly and participants were randomly assigned to one of the two
versions.
Thus, in each version of the experiment there were 12 critical trait-implying
sentences followed by the correspondent implied traits for free association, 12 critical
rearranged sentences followed by the correspondent traits (implied in the trait-implying
versions), 12 non-critical trait-implying sentences followed by non-trait words, 12
non-critical rearranged sentences followed by non-trait words. These last 24 non-critical
trials were fillers and were presented in order to avoid a situation where the only times
that trait words were presented for free association they were following trait-implying
sentences. This would have made the study interest in trait inference easier for
participants to detect. Moreover, in 24 trials neutral sentences were followed by
non-trait words. Finally, in the last 12 fillers neutral sentences were followed by traits,
so that not all the neutral sentences were followed by non-traits. All these fillers have
the purpose of hiding the main relationship being investigated - the relation between
the trait-implying sentences and the correspondent implied traits. This relationship was
present in only 12 of the 84 trials.
During the free association task, the experimenter coded as invalid those trials
that were affected by technical issues or those where participants’ “lip popping” noises
were recorded in error as their vocal response. After all trials were completed, to keep
with the cover story regarding the memory test for the sentences, participants were
given a memory test consisting of 20 pairs of similarly worded sentences. Their task was
to identify which of the two versions they had seen earlier. The whole experiment lasted
approximately 20 minutes, after which the participants were thanked and debriefed.
Results and Discussion
Next, we analyzed the reaction times (RTs) in the trials where the target words
were traits. This included the trials where the prompts were preceded by trait-implying
sentences, by rearranged control sentences and by neutral controls sentences. Trials
where the prompts were non-trait words were not included in these analyses first,
because we don’t have any hypotheses for them and second, because any differences
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compared to the trait trials would be difficult to interpret since the two types of
prompts are too different from each other. Trials where recording problems (e.g., those
flagged by the experimenter as affected by an undersensitive or oversensitive
microphone) were detected were excluded, accounting for 5.4%.
Next, we applied an outlier elimination method based on median absolute
deviation with a cutoff of 2 (MAD; Leys, Ley, Klein, Bernard, & Licata, 2013;
Rousseeuw & Croux, 1993). As opposed to the standard deviation from mean criterion
that is highly affected by the presence of outliers (those same outliers that one wants to
eliminate), this method is less affected by outliers because it is based on the deviation
from the median instead of the mean. By using this method, we eliminated 16.70% of
the responses.
Due to the amount of missing data, a Little’s MCAR test (Little, 1988) was
conducted in order to verify if the missing values are missing completely at random.
The Little’s MCAR test obtained for this experiment data resulted in a
Chi− square = 644.41, df = 672, p = .772, which means that no identifiable pattern
exists to the missing data.
A mixed effects ANOVA was conducted. The type of sentence that preceded the
trait (trait-implying, control-rearranged, control-neutral sentences) was the
within-participant independent variable, the version of the material was the
between-participant independent variable and the RT in the free association task was
the dependent variable. All the p-values reported are two-tailed, except when
replication results are reported (experiment 2).
We found a significant effect of type of sentence, F (2, 74) = 5.50, p = .006,
η2p = .13, no significant version effect, F (2, 74) = .40, p = .529, η2p = .01, and no
significant interaction between version and type of sentence, F (2, 74) = .91, p = .407,
η2p = .02. This means the version of the material did not lead to different patterns of
results. As shown in figure 1, the reaction time to generate a word was significantly
shorter when the preceding sentence implied the trait (M = 1628.79, SD = 226.45)
than when it was a rearranged version (M = 1715.29, SD = 277.28), t(38) = 2.27,
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p = .029, or when it was a neutral sentence (M = 1745.17, SD = 279.42), t(38) = 3.10,
p = .004. The neutral condition did not vary from the rearranged one, t(38) = .88,
p = .385. From this result, we can conclude that reading trait-implying sentences, as
opposed to rearranged or neutral, leads to the activation of the traits and their semantic
networks, which facilitates the generation of associates in the free association task.
Thus, as predicted, this measure seems to be sensitive to trait inference since a
significant difference in the latencies to generate an associate between the trait-implying
sentences and the two types of control sentences was found.
The data of the experiments reported in the paper can be downloaded here:
osf.io/c5ju9.
Experiment 2
In the second experiment, we compared the efficacy of MFAP with other two
activation measures used to detect inferences: the naming task and the modified Stroop
task.
In experiment 1, the free association task was applied immediately after reading
the sentence, but testing inference in delayed mode can give us access to inferences that
need more time to develop. Some researchers think that stabilized inferences that
become part of the representation of the event occur only during a later stage of
information processing (Kintsch, 1988). Thus, in the current experiment we tested
MFAP in a delayed fashion. In this experiment we also added a priming manipulation
where the trait itself was sometimes presented as a subliminal prime before being
presented as a target. The goal was to prime perceptual features of the word and thus
facilitate the access to it. This is relevant, especially if the inference is only partially
encoded as argued by minimalist hypothesis theorists (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986, 1989b,
1990). In the minimalist hypothesis, it is claimed that an inferences that is not
necessary for text coherence is only minimally or partially encoded. Thus, by providing
a subliminal prime, the inference can be instantiated more firmly. This means stronger
facilitation is expected with the prime than without it in both MFAP and naming task.
In the modified Stroop task, the prime is expected to lead to opposite results. Since the
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actual presentation of the target activates the lexical format of the inference and as
discussed in the introduction section, it should lead to facilitation instead of interference
in ink color naming.
Method
Participants. 77 students from the University of Lisbon took part in this
experiment in exchange for a 10 euro voucher. 27 were males and the sample’s average
age was 22.67 (SD = 3.41) years old. In this experiment, we used a larger sample size
than in the previous experiment because naming is described in the literature as a less
sensitive task and thus, a larger sample might be necessary to detect the effect.
Material. This experiment was conducted with participants that spoke
Portuguese, so the material (sentences and traits) was pre-tested for this population.
The critical material consisted of 36 pairs of sentences and the corresponding traits. 12
of these pairs were selected from Pre-test 1 and the other 24 from the Pre-test 2
(Orghian, Ramos, Reis, & Garcia-Marques, in press). The purpose of both pre-tests was
to select pairs of sentences in which the rearranged sentence sounded as natural as the
trait-implying sentence, but implied the trait less than the trait-implying one (or ideally
did not imply the trait at all). Because this objective was not accomplished in the first
pre-test, the second one was conducted in order to create new sentences.
Pre-test 1: in this pre-test 48 pairs of rearranged and trait-implying sentences were used. Each
trait-implying sentence was presented to 110 participants and each rearranged sentence was presented
to other 41 participants. The participants were instructed to read the sentences and indicate the three
personality traits that best described the person performing the behavior in the sentence. Next, the
traits generated in the first position were analyzed. After detecting the most frequently generated trait
for each trait-implying sentence, we calculated how frequently the same trait was generated for the
rearranged version. The traits that were most frequently generated in the trait-implying sentences (M
= .56, SD = .15) were significantly less generated in the rearranged versions (M = .16, SD = .19),
t(47) = 13.74, p < .01. From the 48 pairs, 12 pairs of sentences were selected to be further used in the
experiment. The criteria for this selected was a subjective evaluation of the framing of the rearranged
sentences, performed by the first author. In order to compare the generation of the critical trait in the
selected and in the non-selected sentences, a mixed effects ANOVA was conducted, where the
within-item factor was the sentence (trait-implying or rearranged) and the between-item factor was
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being selected or not for the experiment. As expected, and in agreement with the t-test presented
above, a main effect of sentences was found, F (1, 46) = 127.90, p < .001, η2p = .74. However, no
significant interaction between the sentences and the selection for the experiment was found,
F (1, 46) = 2.20, p = .15, η2p = .05.
Pre-test 2: the second pilot was conducted with the purpose of obtaining trait-implying
sentences illustrative of a large set of personality traits (223). 293 participants took part in this
pre-test. Each participant was presented with 15 personality traits randomly chosen from this set and
their task was to generate a typical behavior for each trait. Participants were instructed to think about
people they knew and concrete behaviors. They were also told to avoid using adjectives, and to be as
specific as possible in their behavioral descriptions. Two independent judges each received half of the
presented traits and the correspondent behavioral descriptions generated by the participants in the
pre-test. After eliminating answers that were not behavioral descriptions and redundancies, the judges
selected 2 to 3 behavioral descriptions that better illustrated each trait. Traits with similar behavioral
descriptions, usually synonym traits, were grouped under the same trait label. This resulted in 154
pairs of trait-behavioral descriptions. Two new judges received these pairs and were instructed to select
the best behavioral description, that is, the sentence that most strongly implied the trait. Moreover,
the same two judges created rearranged versions for each of the 154 trait-implying sentences. An effort
was made to use as many words from the trait-implying sentences in their rearranged versions as
possible. The newly created rearranged sentences were then presented to four new judges. The first two
judges (group A) were asked to indicate the first word that came to their mind when reading the
sentences and the other two (group B) were instructed to evaluate to what extent the sentence was
related to the trait using a 9-point scale ranging from not related (1) to very related (9). If at least one
of the judges from group A generated the target trait for the control sentence, that pair of sentences
(rearranged/implying) was excluded from the final set. Moreover, if both judges from group B rated the
relation between the rearranged sentence and the trait with a value higher than 5, that pair of sentences
was also excluded from the set. This filtering left us with 124 pairs of trait implying/rearranged
sentences, from which 24 were used in the current experiment. The pairs of sentences in which the
rearranged version sounded more natural to the authors were selected. In order to compare the selected
and the non-selected sentences, the average of the ratings of the two judges in group B was calculated
for each rearranged sentence. The ratings for the selected sentences (M = 2.94, SD = 1.25) were not
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significantly different from the non-selected ones (M = 2.80, SD = 1.37), t(122) = .465, p = .463. Note
that for both selected and non-selected sets the average ratings are low because they correspond to the
rearranged sentences, which are not expected to be related with the critical traits.
Aside from the 36 critical pairs of trait-implying and rearranged sentences, we also
used 36 neutral sentences. Some of the neutral sentences were not even behavioral
descriptions (e.g., “In the winter the days are shorter”). In addition to the 36 traits
that corresponded to the critical sentences, we also utilized a set of 36 non-trait words.
Procedure
Participants were told they were going to take part in four unrelated studies. All
participants started with a sentence-memory task that corresponded to the learning
phase during which the behavioral information was presented. The following three tasks
that corresponded to the three test phases, were counterbalanced in terms of the order
they were performed in. The three test phases were the naming task (reading words),
the modified free association task (saying the first word that came to mind upon the
sight of provided words) and the modified Stroop task (saying the color ink in which
words were written). The cover story for the sentence learning phase was that we
wanted to investigate long-term memory of complex material and that is why they were
participating in 3 other studies before being tested for that material. Note that
contrary to experiment 1, in experiment 2 the measurements are delayed, meaning the
measurements do not happen immediately after reading each sentence, but during a
later phase after memorizing all the sentences. The participants were also randomly
assigned to the prime or no-prime condition. The only difference between the two is
that in the prime condition, the target words presented for naming, free association or
modified Stroop tasks were also presented as subliminal primes prior to the presentation
of the sentence in the learning phase. This was designed to strengthen the inferential
process in the critical trials.
The sentence learning task started with six practice trials that were followed by 72
experimental sentences. From the full set of 36 sentences, 18 critical trait-implying
sentences (and their correspondent traits) were randomly selected for each participant.
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The remaining 18 critical pairs and the corresponding traits were used in the rearranged
condition. This prevented the same participant from seeing the two versions (the
trait-implying and the rearranged sentences) of the same trait. Thus, in this phase,
each participant memorized 18 trait-implying sentences, 18 rearranged sentences, and
36 neutral sentences that did not imply traits.
In the no-prime condition, each trial started with 800 ms fixation dot, followed by
the presentation of the sentence for 3500 ms and ended with a 500 ms blank screen. In
the prime condition, before the presentation of the sentence, and after the fixation dot,
a 150 ms mask preceded the prime which was presented for 16 ms. The prime was
followed by another mask that was presented for another 16 ms. Next the sentence was
presented for 3500 ms, followed by the 500 ms blank screen. 37 participants took part
in the prime condition and the remaining 40 took part in the non-prime condition.
After the sentence learning task, the naming, the free association and the Stroop tasks
followed. The procedures in the three tasks were identical in the prime and in the
no-prime condition (this manipulation takes place in the learning phase). All the three
tasks started with six practice trials that were also used to adjust the microphone to the
participant’s voice. In the naming task, participants were told that the goal of the task
was to study reading skills. Participants were instructed to read as fast as possible the
words presented on the screen. Before the word appeared, a fixation dot was presented
for 800 ms and a 40 ms blank screen followed. The word was presented next and stayed
on the screen until the microphone detected a response. The experimenter took notes
about the accuracy of the responses. After the response was detected, and before the
following trial, a 500 ms blank screen was displayed. This procedure was identical in the
free association and the modified Stroop task except for the instructions and the fact
that the words in the Stroop task were written in blue, yellow, green or red ink. In the
association task, the participants were told that the goal of the task was to investigate
the speed with which people generate new words. And thus, when the words appeared
on the screen they were instructed to say as fast as possible the first word that came to
their mind after reading the prompt. They were also told that there was no right or
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wrong response and to say any word that came to their mind regardless of how
ridiculous it may sound. In the modified Stroop task, the instruction was to say as fast
and accurate as possible the color ink in which the word was written. And the cover
story for the Stroop was that we were interested in investigating color naming abilities.
All the participants did the three tasks, and from the 18 traits that were implied in the
18 trait-implying sentences memorized in the first part of the study, six were presented
in the naming task, six in the free association task and six in the modified Stroop task.
A further six traits that corresponded to the rearranged sentences learned in the first
phase, were presented in each of the tasks. In each task, besides the 12 traits (six in the
rearranged and six in the trait-implying condition), there were 24 non-trait words
unrelated to any of the sentences presented before. After participants finished the three
tasks, a memory test regarding the sentences was performed, just to remain consistent
to the initial cover story. This test consisted of 16 pairs of similarly worded sentences
and the task was to identify which of the two versions was seen earlier. The
presentation order of the trials in each of the five phases (the learning phase, the three
test phases and the memory test for the sentences) was randomized for each participant
individually.
Results and Discussion
After eliminating trials affected by recording problems and incorrect responses
(5.1%) from the critical trials (trait prompts), the same outlier removal method used in
experiment 1 was applied (9.6% of responses were eliminated based on this criteria).
A mixed effects ANOVA was conducted, with the presence of the prime (present
or absent) being the between-participant independent variable, the task (free
association, Stroop or naming) being the first within-participant independent variable,
the type of sentence (trait-implying or rearranged) being the second within-participant
independent variable and the RT being the dependent variable.
Besides a main effect of task, F (2, 144) = 860.60, p < .001, η2p = .92, and a main
effect of type of sentence, F (2, 144) = 10.09, p = .002, η2p = .12, an interaction between
the task and the type of sentence was found, F (2, 144) = 11.50, p = .001, η2p = .14. As
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shown in figure 2 the participants performed differently in the three tasks. Moreover,
there was no significant prime effect, F (2, 144) = 2.56, p = .11, η2p = .03. The
interaction between the task and the prime, F (2, 144) = 1.59, p = .207, η2p = .02, and
the interaction between the type of sentence and the prime, F (2, 144) = 1.93, p = .170,
η2p = .03, did not reach significance. A three-way interaction was also not detected,
F (2, 144) = .44, p = .648, η2p = .01.
To better understand the results underlying the interaction between the task and
the type of sentence, pairwise comparisons were performed. They revealed a strong
inference in the free association task, with larger RTs in the rearranged condition
(M = 1887.76, SD = 451.17) than in the trait-implying condition (M = 1721.54,
SD = 377.41), F (2, 144) = 11.28, p = .001, η2p = .14. No such difference was found in
the modified Stroop task, F (2, 144) = .08, p = .772, η2p = .001 (trait-implying:
M = 671.07, SD = 71.18; rearranged: M = 669.24, SD = 72.93), or in the naming task,
F (2, 144) = .44, p = .509, η2p = .01 (trait-implying: M = 581.51, SD = 61.79;
rearranged: M = 578.52, SD = 59.54). The result obtained in the free association task
replicated the results from our first experiment.
Even though the three-way interaction was not significant, we conducted separate
pairwise comparisons for the prime and no-prime conditions. In the free association
task, an inference was observed, F (2, 144) = 8.90, p = .004, η2p = .11 (trait-implying:
M = 1641.14, SD = 359.24; rearranged: M = 1852.66, SD = 490.19) when the prime
was present and when prime was absent, F (2, 144) = 3.07, p = .042 (one-tailed),
η2p = .04 (trait-implying: M = 1801.94, SD = 393.57; rearranged: M = 1922.86,
SD = 410.52). In the Stroop task, no inference was found in the prime condition,
F (2, 144) = 1.84, p = .179, η2p = .03 (trait-implying: M = 646.60, SD = 58.62;
rearranged: M = 658.84, SD = 60.68) and a marginal interference was detected in the
condition without prime, F (2, 144) = 3.27, p = .075, η2p = .04 (trait-implying:
M = 695.54, SD = 81.24; rearranged: M = 679.64, SD = 82.83). In the naming task,
no inference was detected in the prime condition, F (2, 144) = .1.59, p = .212, η2p = .02
(trait-implying: M = 575.30, SD = 47.21; rearranged: M = 583.42, SD = 55.79), but
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an opposite of an inference effect was detected in the condition without the prime,
F (2, 144) = 5.05, p = .028, η2p = .07 (trait-implying: M = 587.73, SD = 72.91;
rearranged: M = 573.61, SD = 62.84). We don’t have an explanation for this inverted
pattern of results.
The results of experiment 2 suggest that the naming task is the least sensitive
task to STI, while Stroop task and, in particular, the new paradigm we are introducing,
MFAP, performed in the expected way, that is, served to distinguish the trials where
inference is expected to occur from those where it is not.
Experiment 3
In experiment 3, we explored how the information inferred from the sentence is
integrated with other relevant material. Our hypothesis was that the information is
differently integrated depending on the relevance of the actor to the behavior.
This final study also allows us to test the paradigm’s sensitivity to spontaneous
trait transference (STT), the tendency to transfer the inferred trait to a person who
only describes the behavior of a third party or who is simultaneously presented with the
behavioral information (e.g., Carlston et al., 1995; Skowronski et al., 1998). In fact,
Brown and Bassili (2002) published an article whose title contained the expression
“superstitious banana”, where they showed that trait transference can even be extended
to inanimate objects. Goren and Todorov (2009) showed that STT occurs even when
participants are told that the behavioral description was randomly paired with the
person. Moreover, evidence suggests that trait information is differently processed in
STI and STT. Differences include a stronger effect of STI than STT (e.g., Brown &
Bassili, 2002; Skowronski et al., 1998; Goren & Todorov, 2009), the reduction or
elimination of STT effects when the actor is presented concurrently (Crawford,
Skowronski, & Stiff, 2007; Goren & Todorov, 2009; Todorov & Uleman, 2004) and a
generalization of trait impressions in the form of halo effect in STI but not STT
(Crawford, Skowronski, & Stiff, 2007; Carlston & Skowronski, 2005; Skowronski et al.,
1998). These differences have led to an ongoing debate about the nature of the
cognitive processes that underlie them, with some proposing a two-process approach (an
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attribution-based (or inferential) process in STI and an associative process in STT; e.g.,
Carlston & Skowronski, 2005; Crawford, Skowronski, & Stiff, 2007) and others, a
contrasting single-process model based on different strengths of association between the
trait and the person (Brown & Bassili, 2002; Bassili & Smith, 1986; Orghian,
Garcia-Marques, Uleman, & Heinke, 2015). A paradigm that is sensitive to both STI
and STT can make a useful contribution to this debate. By using MFAP, we predict
that there will be a stronger STI effect than STT (Brown & Bassili, 2002; Goren &
Todorov, 2009; Skowronski et al., 1998) because a larger activation of the semantic
network of the inferred trait is expected in STI and, in particular, a larger integration of
these activations within the representation of the actor. Consequently, this will lead to
faster reaction times to deliver an associate word when the prompt is the trait that was
inferred about that actor.
Method
Participants. 51 first-year undergraduate students from Birmingham
University, UK, participated for academic credits. 2 were males and the average age of
the sample was 18.86 (SD = .89) years old. As opposed to experiment 1, where we were
looking for a main effect, in this experiment we were looking for an interaction (as
explained below) and for this reason we slightly increased the sample size.
Material. The same 24 trait-implying sentences tested in the pilot study from
experiment 1 are used in this experiment. Along with the 24 critical sentences, 48
neutral sentences were given for memorization in the learning phase. For the free
association task, the 24 critical traits were used, 24 non-trait words that were associated
with the sentence (e.g., for the sentence “She ordered a bottle of wine during dinner.”
the prompt word was “restaurant”) and 24 non-trait words that were part of 24 neutral
sentences (e.g., the sentence “Because she was robbed, she had no money to pay the
bills.” contains the prompt word “robbed”). As explained later, the main purpose of
these fillers is to explore the sensitivity of the paradigm to different levels of activation.
A word that is part of the sentence is expected to be more activated than a word that is
related with the sentence. Moreover, we want to compare the trait inference effect with
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the activation of other non-trait words inferred or associated with the sentence. In
addition to the words and sentences, 72 black and white photos of people with neutral
expressions were used (Lundqvist, Flykt, & Öhman, 1998).
Procedure
Participants were told that the goal of the study was to investigate how people
memorize different types of information and how they multitask. The study consisted of
two phases, a learning phase and a free association test phase. In the learning phase
participants were instructed to memorize photo-sentence pairs of material. In this phase
there were two conditions: a STI (relevant) condition where the person presented in the
photo was said to be the actor of the action described in the sentence and a STT
(irrelevant) condition where the person in the photo was said to be unrelated to the
behavioral sentence. STT occurs if the trait inferred from the sentence is transferred to
the irrelevant person in the photo. Henceforth, this is referred to as the relevance
manipulation. As in Goren and Todorov’s (2009) studies, in the STT condition the
participants were told that the person and the sentence were randomly paired instead of
saying that the person in the photo is communicating the behavior of a third party, as
it is commonly done in the literature (e.g., Skowronski et al., 1998; Crawford,
Skowronski, Stiff, & Scherer, 2007; Crawford et al., 2008). We used the random pairing
method because otherwise the participant might make assumptions about the
relationship between the communicator and the person being described and
consequently infer that the communicator has similar (or dissimilar) traits to those he is
describing (e.g., the communicator chose to talk about behaviors he agrees with (or
disagrees), or because they have person relevance of the communicator, etc.). Photo
relevance was made explicit in the learning phase by presenting the photos in one of two
colored borders. Instructions explained that when the sentence described the actions of
the person in the photo, the photo would be presented in a blue border and when the
text was randomly paired with the photo, it would be shown in a red border (see figure
3). The participants were explicitly instructed to memorize all the information
regardless of the type of photograph. In the four practice trials, reminder text regarding
MODIFIED FREE ASSOCIATION PARADIGM AND STI 35
the meaning of the borders’ colors was shown underneath each photo. In the STT
condition, the gender of the person in the photo was opposite to the gender of the
pronoun used in the sentence, to emphasize that there was no relation between the
person and behavior. The learning phase consisted of 72 trials (36 STI and 36 STT).
Each trial started with a 500 ms fixation dot that was followed by the simultaneous
presentation of the sentence and the photo for 6000 ms. The photo was presented in the
center of the screen and the sentence was presented underneath the photo. After the
sentence and the photo disappeared, a new trial began. A “spot the differences”
distractor task lasting three minutes followed the learning phase. Next, participants
read the instructions for the test phase and had an opportunity to ask questions before
and after four practice trials. In the test phase we reminded them that we were
interested in investigating their multitasking abilities and thus, they had to perform two
different tasks simultaneously in each trial. 1) They were presented with the same
photos again and were instructed to use this second chance to better learn the photos
and 2) a word would be presented and they had to say the first word coming to their
mind. The free association trials began with a 500 ms fixation cross followed by a bleep
warning. Next, one of the photos presented earlier, this time without an identifying
border, appeared in the center of the screen for 1000 ms. The prompt word then
appeared directly underneath the photo and remained until a vocal response was
detected. Once a response was recorded a blank screen was shown for 500 ms, followed
by the final screen which stated ‘press C to continue’.
There were different types of critical trials in the test phase. Half the photos were
photos from the STT condition in the learning phase and the other half from the STI
condition. In the critical trials, the prompt was the trait implied in the trait-implying
sentence presented during the learning phase. In the filler trials, the word wasn’t a trait,
rather it was a word that was related to a neutral sentence or a word that was part of a
neutral sentence presented in the learning phase. In this phase, there were two types of
pairings, the match and the mismatch/control trials. In match trials, the photo was
presented with the trait (word) implied (associated with or presented) in the sentence
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presented with that photo in the learning phase. In the mismatch trials, the photo was
presented with a trait (word) that was inferred (associated with or presented) in a
sentence presented in the learning phase with a different photo. Thus, each type of
target word could be in one of the four relevance-pairing conditions; relevant/match,
relevant/mismatch; irrelevant/match, irrelevant mismatch. Again, this manipulation is
based on Goren and Todorov’s (2009) and Todorov and Uleman’s (2002) work. An
example of the irrelevant condition with the two types of pairing is shown in figure 3.
The difference between the match and the mismatch condition informs us about the
integration of the trait into the representation of the actor or into the representation of
the irrelevant person. In the case of the irrelevant person, the integration is expected to
be much less. If the trait is inferred from the sentence and bound to the person, then, in
the test phase, when the trait is presented with that person, a facilitation is expected.
In other words, the photo will re-instantiate the inferred trait and its network, making
it easier to generate an associate when the trait is presented for the free association
task. For each participant, there were 24 critical trials, 12 STI (from which 6 were
match and 6 mismatch) and 12 STT (6 match and 6 mismatch) trials. The assignment
of the sentences to the photos and the presentation order were randomized individually
for each participant. Note that in this case, we don’t have rearranged sentences, the
control is the mismatch condition. Not using rearranged sentences might seem a
problem, but the fact that we already used these sentences in experiment 1 and
demonstrated they were able to detect inference means we can be confident the material
captures inference beyond the word-based priming. We have also shown, in previous
research, that not using rearranged controls is not a serious problem when the measure
is delayed (Orghian et al., n.d.) because the activation which arises from specific words
in the sentence decays with time, while the inference itself does not suffer such decay.
Results and Discussion
Spoiled trials (recording problems flagged by the experiment) were eliminated,
making a total of 9.12% of the whole set of responses. Next, the same MAD method
was applied, eliminating 14.38% of the remaining responses.
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In this experiment, once more, the amount of missing values is larger than 20%. A
Little’s MCAR test was conducted in order to verify if the missing values are missing
completely at random. The Little’s MCAR test obtained for this experiment data
resulted in a Chi− square = 1427.45, df = 1490, p = .875, which tells us that no
identifiable pattern exists to the missing data.
A repeated measure ANOVA was conducted. All the trials were included in the
analysis: - the critical trials where the prompt words are traits implied in the
correspondent sentences, - the trials where the prompts are non-trait words that are
part of the sentences and - the trials where the prompts are non-trait words that are
only associated with the correspondent sentences. The first factor is the type of trial
(critical, non-trait present, or non-trait associated), the second is the relevance of the
photo (actor face – STI condition or irrelevant face – STT condition) and the third
factor is the pairing between the face and the trait (match or mismatch). As presented
in figure 4, a significant three-way interaction was found between the type of trial, the
relevance and the pairing, F (2, 100) = 3.49, p = .034, η2p = .07.
Pairwise comparisons were conducted for each type of trial. For the critical trials,
a larger facilitation was detected for the actor in the match condition (M = 1556.49,
SD = 278.74) than in the mismatch condition (M = 1672.70, SD = 379.57),
F (2, 100) = 4.69, p = .035, η2p = .09. The opposite pattern was detected in the
irrelevant condition, with a larger facilitation in the mismatching pairs (M = 1549.88,
SD = 282.93) than in the matching pairs (M = 1643.98, SD = 333.48),
F (2, 100) = 3.21, p = .079, η2p = .06.
A similar result was obtained in the trials where the prompt word is an associate
of the sentence. When the photo presented at test was the actor, there was a significant
difference between the match (M = 1393.33, SD = 192.50) than the mismatch
condition (M = 1482.00, SD = 228.02), F (2, 100) = 7.84, p = .007, η2p = .14. The
opposite pattern was detected in the irrelevant condition, with a larger facilitation in
the mismatch (M = 1344.92, SD = 206.73) than in the match condition (M = 1422.79,
SD = 241.99), F (2, 100) = 3.77, p = .058, η2p = .07.
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Finally, for the presented targets, the difference between match (M = 1278.91,
SD = 190.74) and mismatch condition (M = 1296.43, SD = 173.66) when the person is
the actor was not significant, F (2, 100) = .42, p = .521, η2p = .008, and the same was
true for the irrelevant person (match condition: M = 1323.42, SD = 207.42 and
mismatch condition: M = 1330.12, SD = 208.34), F (2, 100) = .028, p = .868, η2p = .001.
The main difference between STI and STT conditions is in the amount of
integration of the trait information into the representation of the person. The trait
becomes strongly associated with the representation of the actor, but it does not with
the representation of the irrelevant person. More specifically, in this experiment we
show that the MFAP can also be used to study the link between the trait and the actor.
The paradigm led to distinguishable effects in STI and STT conditions. This
dissociation is originated by an unexpected pattern of results found in the STT
condition. Instead of a smaller effect we find an opposite effect, that is, there is more
facilitation for the mismatch condition than for the match condition. This opposite
pattern might be interpreted as a reflection of an inhibitory mechanism triggered by the
presence of an irrelevant person. When the person in the photo is not the actor, the
participant might inhibit the trait inferred and its linkage to the person. Thus, in the
test phase, when the photo is presented, the trait inferred from the sentence presented
with that irrelevant person might be suppressed and so its semantic network. When the
trait does not much the photo, a process similar to the release from inhibition
(MacLeod, 1989; Geiselman & Bagheri, 1985) might be taking place. The same
dissociation was found for the trials where the targets were non-trait words associated
with neutral sentences. However, the fact that this same unexpected effect is not found
for the words that were actually part of the sentences might be suggesting that what is
being inhibited is not the sentence per se. We cannot say that the photo of the
irrelevant person is being inhabited either, because in that case the inhibition would be
detected in all the trials, including the fillers where the prompts were part of the
neutral sentences. So, a possible but speculative explanation is that the link between
the photo and the inferred concept is being inhibited.
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In sum, experiment 3 shows that MFAP can we used to investigate other facets of
STI and, in particular, that the paradigm is sensitive to other relevant information
about the actor that is provided to the participant in the context of the task.
General Discussion
Our experiments were motivated by a desire to overcome some of the main
limitations of the traditional paradigms used to study STI. An important characteristic
of STI paradigms is that all of them need to use cover stories in order to make the
participant process the trait-implying behavioral descriptions without triggering explicit
goals of impression formation. One popular way of doing this is by instructing the
participants to memorize the material for a later unspecified memory test. Later, during
a memory test, the participants are required to contrast a target (the trait) against the
memorized material (the behavioral sentence). For such a contrast to be possible, the
participant has to retrieve (or attempt to) the memorized material. However, retrieving
the sentence at the test might trigger trait inference at that moment in time. If this
happens, it means the inference is not a result of processing the sentence and
spontaneously inferring the trait from it, but a result of retrieval processes happening
later on. This problem is called contamination with explicit retrieval. Paradigms based
on procedures that require retrieval of memorized material are called memory-based
measures. Cued-recall (Winter & Uleman, 1984), probe recognition (Uleman, Hon, et
al., 1996), savings in relearning (Carlston & Skowronski, 1994) and false recognition
(Goren & Todorov, 2009) are memory-based measures that can be easily contaminated
by explicit retrieval processes. A way to overcome contamination is by accessing the
inference without requiring the participants to explicitly retrieve the learned
information (Keenan et al., 1990). Activation measures are usually presented as the
solution for the contamination problem, but these measures have their own drawbacks.
Interestingly, activation measures are uncommon in STI research and we suspect that it
is because they might be less sensitive to top-down phenomena like STIs. In other
words, activation measures rely on superficial processing of the material, and thus might
be less sensitive to STI. Moreover, some activation measures like the naming task and
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the lexical decision task rely on very fast responses and, for that reason, floor effects
might be more frequent than in memory measures (Potts et al., 1988).
In the present paper, we introduced a new paradigm, the Modified Free
Association Paradigm (MFAP), a conceptually-driven measure. The measure follows
Hourihan and Macleod’s (2007) rationale in which it is claimed that if a word is
conceptually processed, the spread of activation will extend to other words within the
semantic network. This priming of the semantic network will lead to faster reaction
times when the participant has to generate an associate for the inferred trait. This task
seems capable of detecting activations present in the semantic area that sustains the
inference and not just the inferred concept per se.
In experiment 1, after reading trait-implying and rearranged sentences,
participants were presented with targets and instructed to say the first word that came
to their mind. The RTs to generate a word upon the sight of a target trait were shorter
when the target followed a sentence that implied the trait than when the target followed
a sentence that did not imply that trait. We interpreted this difference in RTs as being
due to the fact that the trait is spontaneously inferred during the reading of the
implying sentences and, as a consequence, the semantic network of that trait becomes
activated, facilitating the generation of associates in the free association task.
In experiment 2, we used a delayed version of the MFAP together with a naming
task and a modified Stroop task. We did not find STIs with the naming task, which
might be due to its lower sensitivity to conceptual activation or due to a floor effect
(Norris, 1986; Keenan et al., 1990). Potts and colleagues (1988), for example, also
suggested in their work that naming might not be sensitive to inference, which is
consistent with the very short RTs they reported with this task (423 ms). We did,
however, find some evidence that making an inference interfered with performance in
the modified Stroop task. And, replicating the result in experiment 1, a facilitation to
generate associates for the traits implied in previously seen sentences was detected with
the MFAP. Crucially, this experiment suggests that the MFAP allows for trait inference
detection even when applied in a delayed fashion.
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The aim of experiment 3 was to validate the paradigm’s sensitivity to the
relevance of the actor, and thus to Spontaneous Trait Transference (STT). STT is a
neighboring effect of STI that consists of the association of the inferred trait to the
wrong person. As predicted, and in agreement with the strong STI effect usually found
in the literature, a facilitation effect was found in the trials where the person presented
together with the behavioral description was the actor of the actions described in the
sentence. An opposite effect was found for trials where an irrelevant person was
presented together with the behavioral information. Contrary to the usual difference
found in the magnitudes of the two effects (i.e., STI larger than STT, Brown & Bassili,
2002; Goren & Todorov, 2009; Skowronski et al., 1998), we found a dissociation between
the two phenomena that suggests the existence of two processes, one responsible for STI
and one for STT. This finding is in agreement with past evidence showing differences
between STI and STT across a range of situations (Crawford, Skowronski, & Stiff, 2007;
Goren & Todorov, 2009; Todorov & Uleman, 2004). However, instead of assuming that
a complex process such attributional thinking is taking place in STI (Skowronski et al.,
1998), it is also possible that the process in STI is purely associative and something else
is happening in STT, like inhibition, an attempt (conscious or not) to suppress the
erroneous association between unrelated information. This interesting speculation that
seems to emerge from our data needs further testing.
Even though this paradigm apparently leaves us with more questions than answers
in what concerns the processes underlying STI and STT, we believe that it can bring us
a step closer to understanding the mechanisms and the differences between these two
phenomena. Moreover, past research shows that the introduction of a new paradigm
can uncover new findings and new perspectives of the investigated phenomena. The
creation of savings in relearning paradigm for instance, that was intended to provide a
measure of the actor-trait link, inadvertently led to the identification of the spontaneous
trait transference phenomenon (Carlston et al., 1995, experiment 4).
In summary, the experiments presented in this paper suggest that the modified
free association paradigm may be a viable tool to use in future trait inference research.
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The task presents characteristics that makes it appealing when compared to the more
traditional paradigms. To start with, participants process the material under memory
instruction without encouraging explicit trait inference, a crucial condition to grasp a
spontaneous phenomenon. The task is an activation measure, as opposed to a memory
measure. This means it is implausible that the inference results from contrasting the
trait against the memorized sentence during test, since the participant is not asked to
retrieve the sentence or to consider any past events while performing the free
association task. This measure, when used with rearranged controls, can ensure that
“real” inferences, and not just activation coming from word-based priming, are being
detected. Filler trials are also used making the goal of the task less obvious to the
participant. An important advantage of this task is that it allows us to measure the
access to the semantic network of a trait and not only the activation of the trait itself.
This is of particular relevance in the context of the minimalist hypothesis (e.g.,
McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986) that claims that more elaborate inferences are only partially
activated. Thus, if an inference is not totally computed, being able to access related
neighbors that support that inference might be informative in regard to the activation
state of that concept. Moreover, contrary to the lexical decision and naming tasks, in
which the responses are given in a very short time window (between 600 and 700 ms in
the lexical decision and between 500 and 600 ms in the naming task), and are thus less
sensitive to top-down thinking, MFAP takes longer (because generating words is more
difficult, it take usually more than 1500 ms) leaving more room for top-down influences
to be detected. Moreover, MFAP is a conceptually-driven task that fits better with a
conceptual mechanism taking place in STI.
Although our findings suggest that the free association task is sensitive to trait
inference, its validity requires further testing. In particular, the next important step is
to investigate how MFAP is affected by backward associations. The backward priming
is an interesting aspect of trait inference because it relates to a theoretical dichotomy
between inductive (from behavior to trait) and deductive (from trait to behavior)
inferences. Maass, Colombo, Colombo and Sherman (2001) introduced the term
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induction-deduction asymmetry (IDA) after showing that people draw more
behavior-to-trait inferences than trait-to-behavior inferences. Note that backward
association is exactly the generation of a behavior from a given trait; it is a deductive
inference. The rationale behind this result is the fact that a single trait may find
expression in many different behaviors whereas a behavior is usually diagnostic on one
or few traits. In other words, a trait is linked to many behaviors while a behavior is
linked to fewer traits. And assuming that activation is inversely related to the number
of existing relations/links, the activation of a concept/node results in a “fan effect”,
that is, each link receives only part of the entire activation. The fan effect is suggested
to be larger for the deductive inference because the trait is linked to many behaviors
and thus, the connection of the trait to each of those behaviors is weaker. This finding
suggests that what we have been calling backward association might be weaker than the
forward association in the context of trait inference. However, it is still necessary to
verify if results similar to the ones obtained in this paper can be explained purely based
on backward associations.
Moreover, in the third experiment, one can argue that during the test phase, when
the photo is presented for the second time, it is conceivable to think that the participant
might try to recall the behavior as a strategy to improve their memory of the photo.
This recollection of the behavior can trigger the inference at test. A subliminal priming
of the photo could solve this problem by decreasing the probability of explicit sentence
recall, a modification that should be considered in future research. And finally, even if
fillers are used and the relation between the memorization phase and the free association
phase is not obvious, we don’t know for sure that the participants are not aware of it.
Thus, in order to verify if the participants are aware of the purpose of the experiment, a
questionnaire or a structured interview should be applied after the test phase.
To sum up, our final remark is that there is no such thing as a perfect paradigm,
and because of that, researchers, when conducting their research, should 1) consider the
different paradigms they have available, 2) know their limitations and advantages, and
3) combine more than one paradigm to answer the same research question in order to
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gain confidence over the outcome.
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Table 1
Paradigms and their limitations.
Paradigm Demand Contamination Backward association Word-priming Conceptual Delayed
Cued-recall NO NO NO NO YES YES
Probe recognition YES NO NO YES NO YES
Saving relearning YES NO NO NO YES YES
False recognition NO NO NO NO NO YES
Lexical decision YES YES NO NO NO YES
Stem completion YES YES NO YES NO YES
Naming* YES YES YES YES NO YES
Stroop* YES YES NO YES NO YES
MFAP* YES YES NO YES YES YES
Note. * new paradigms in the context of trait inference research; "NO" - limitation not solved,
"YES" - limitation solved.
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Figure 1 . Mean reaction time in function of type of sentence in Experiment 1.
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Modified Stroop Task
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Modified Free Association Task
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Figure 2 . Mean reaction time in function of task, prime condition and type of sentence
in Experiment 2.
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Figure 3 . Example screen views of one learning trial and two free association trials
showing different pairing conditions. Image a. depicts an irrelevant learning trial
(identified by border color and pronoun gender); images b. and c. illustrate a match or
mismatch/control pairing, respectively.
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Mismatch Actor
Figure 4 . Mean reaction time in function of type of trial, relevance and pairing in
Experiment 3.
